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Abstract 
 
The relationship between ministers and public servants has been a longstanding topic among 
students of Australian public administration.  Recent debate has centred on issues of supposed 
politicisation and excessive responsiveness in the APS, caused, in part, by the weakened tenure 
of department heads (secretaries).  The recent Moran report endorses changes to the appointment 
processes for secretaries which are presumably designed to strengthen secretaries' independence 
from their political masters, but it does not refer specifically to the relationship with ministers.  The 
report also adopts a view of citizen-centred service and strategic leadership that appears to 
marginalise ministers.  Its approach to public sector leadership is taken from international 
management theory which works well in a business context and in the US government system but 
is less well-suited to Westminster-style systems.  
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Ministers and public servants 
Westminster-based systems of parliamentary government share a common set of 
features, though the commonalities are more in the form of loosely linked family 
resemblances than an essentialist core (Rhodes 2005; Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 
2008). Among these common features are a strong political executive, based typically 
on a cohesive parliamentary majority, and a politically impartial professional public 
service expected to take its lead from the elected government of the day.  The 
relationship between elected ministers and non-elected public servants, especially the 
heads of ministerial departments, is pivotal to the system’s successful operation.  It is 
also a  subject of periodic controversy as leading participants and commentators argue 
over the right balance between the twin, and sometime competing, claims of 
ministers’ democratic legitimacy and public servants’ professional expertise and 
integrity.  A new report on the future development of the Australian Public Service 
(APS) (‘the Moran report’ (Moran 2010)) can therefore be expected to have its own 
particular take on this key relationship. 
The main parameters of the relationship are reasonably clear and 
uncontroversial.  Elections decide who forms a ministry and give the ministry a 
general mandate to govern which is respected by government bureaucrats, particularly 
in departmental agencies directly under ministerial control.   
                                                 
  The author wishes to thank Evert Lindquist for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
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Conventions of ministerial responsibility require ministers to act as the main 
point of public accountability for all actions of their departments and as the main 
rectifiers of perceived government mistakes.  Departmental officials are expected take 
their overall direction and particular instructions from their ministers (APSC 2009, ch 
2).    
These underlying facts about the controlling role of ministers are well-known to 
all experienced public servants and a key element in public service professional 
ethics.  Ministerial briefings for incoming governments carefully outline how the new 
government’s policies could be implemented.  Ministers’ chosen directions and 
preferences are accorded special authority.  ‘The Minister insists on it’ or ‘the 
Minister is dead set against that’ are constant motifs in departmental chit-chat.  
Minister’s demands on the department’s attention, such as preparing answers for 
parliamentary questions or media briefings, take precedence over almost all other 
matters.  Public servants appearing before parliamentary committees are very careful 
to defer to their minister’s right to decide policy and to paint their political masters in 
the best possible light.  Saving ministers from political embarrassment is a key public 
service value.  Responsiveness to the government, in the sense of ministers forming 
the government of the day, is a key component of the APS Values (Public Service Act 
1999, 10 (1), (e) and (f)).   
At the same time, responsiveness has its long-established limits. The legal 
requirements of a merit-based, professional service prevent ministers from intervening 
in most appointment and staffing matters, other than the appointment of department 
heads (secretaries).  Ministers are also quarantined from intervening in many 
administrative decisions in relation to individual citizens, for instance decisions about 
taxation or welfare entitlements.  Public servants are required to resist illegal or 
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ethically inappropriate requests from ministers. More broadly, traditions of 
independent (‘frank and fearless’) advice license public servants to criticise 
government proposals, to suggest alternatives, to evaluate existing policies and to 
conduct their own, policy-related research.   
Within these agreed general limits, controversy has centred on the balance 
between responsiveness and independence, on whether public servants are too 
subservient to ministers or too independent of political direction.  Australia’s most 
comprehensive inquiry into the public service, the report of the Coombs Royal 
Commission which was established in 1974 and reported in 1976, gave exhaustive 
attention to the relations between ministers and public servants and to the nature of 
ministerial responsibility (Coombs 1976, ch 4).  The Commission was keen to move 
beyond traditional understandings of ministerial responsibility associated with 
Westminster (Uhr 1998, 165-6). It stressed the closeness of relations between 
ministers and departmental heads and the impossibility of segregating them into 
distinct spheres of policy and administration, an impossibility that had become a 
familiar nostrum of public administration (eg Spann 1959, 41-2).   Public servants 
were encouraged to play an active and constructive role in policy-making and to be 
responsive not only to ministers but to all sections of society (see also Wilenski 1986, 
ch 10).  
The managerial revolution beginning in the late 1980s built, in part, on Labor 
Party concerns that the bureaucratic mandarins had become too independent of 
ministers and the elected government of the day (Wilenski 1986, 193-5).  It also drew 
on the international reform consensus (later known as the New Public Management0 
which linked greater managerial autonomy to tighter political control over objectives 
and the specification of results (New Zealand Treasury 1987; Hood 1991; Rhodes, 
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Wanna and Weller 2008, 464).   It prompted a vigorous debate about whether the 
distinctive virtues of the public service were being sidelined (Considine and Painter 
1997).  Critics feared that public servants were being reduced to mere instruments of 
ministers’ directions and were being prevented from pursuing their own views of the 
public interest (eg Considine 1988). Defenders of the reforms, such as Dr Michael 
Keating (one of the reforms’ main architects), responded that formulating the public 
interest over matters of policy (as distinct from probity and legality) was the province 
of elected politicians not of unelected public servants (eg Keating 1990).   
The managerial reforms saw the steady reduction in the security of tenure 
enjoyed by secretaries, particularly the introduction in the early 1990s of limited-term 
contracts of employment as a measure designed to emphasise government control 
over the public service (Parker and Nethercote 1996).   The extent of this new control 
was vividly exemplified in 1996 by John Howard, the incoming Coalition Prime 
Minister, who summarily dismissed six incumbent secretaries as a means of stamping 
his own authority on the public service.  The weakened tenure of secretaries prompted 
charges that the public service was being excessively politicised, though the issue of 
politicisation remained contested (Mulgan 1998; Weller 2001).  For example, Dr 
Peter Shergold (Secretary of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2003-08), while supporting 
Michael Keating’s insistence on ministers’ right to decide political direction, 
vigorously defended the integrity of the APS, finding no evidence of improper 
subservience to government (Shergold 2004, 2007).  On the other hand, Andrew 
Podger, a former Australian Public Service Commissioner, argued that the pendulum 
had swung too far away from independence towards responsiveness and called for 
greater security of tenure for secretaries  (Podger 2007a, 2007b; Mulgan 2008).  There 
could be little doubt that ministers were in control.  The main issue was whether they 
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were too much in control, leaving insufficient room for the traditional public service 
values of frank advice and procedural integrity.  
The Moran Report and secretaries’ tenure  
Against this background, where does the ‘Moran Report’ stand on the issue of 
relations between ministers and senior public servants?  The report begins with a 
succinct and unexceptionable summary of the constitutional structure of government, 
with emphasis on the role of the executive branch, made up of ministers, agencies and 
officials, as it operates in Australia’s version of the Westminster model (Moran 2010, 
4-5). Ministers and the APS work in ‘partnership’ (a term also favoured by Coombs 
(Coombs 1976, 19) to develop policy and implement government programs and 
services. The APS ‘must be flexible enough to meet the needs of each Minister’. 
Policy advice is developed ‘to meet the government’s objectives’ and ‘after 
discussion on policy advice, the Minister has the last word’.  
The body of the report is arranged around four major ‘components’: meeting the 
needs of citizens; providing strong leadership and strategic direction; containing a 
highly capable workforce; and operating efficiently and at a consistently high 
standard.  Each of these components give rise to sets of reform (nine in total). The 
first component, ‘meeting the needs of citizens’, refers to relationships with individual 
citizens, local communities and other levels of government.  The other three 
components focus on matters of internal organisation, on what the report refers to as 
‘organisational strategy’ (20) and which it associates with the newly minted 
‘stewardship’ role of  protecting and improving the capability of departments (5). 
Thus, ‘providing strong leadership and strategic direction’ deals primarily with 
improving policy skills and staff development, along with strengthening the roles of 
secretaries and a revitalised Australian Public Service Commission (APSC). 
 6
‘Containing a highly capable workforce’ leads into employment issues, including staff 
recruitment and development, more centralised employment conditions, and trimming 
of the SES.    ‘Operating efficiently and at a consistently high standard’ recommends 
regular external reviews and improved internal efficiency. 
Little mention is made of ministers.  There are brief references to the importance 
of maintaining ‘productive relationships’ with ministers and their private offices (21) 
and to a ‘strong relationship’ between ministers and the APS.  Ministers are the 
recipients of strategic advice from the APS (22). Ministers are to have the right to 
comment on secretaries’ performance, but only along with many others as part of a 
‘360 degree’ feedback (47). Ministers, along with relevant secretaries and the APS 
Commission, will receive copies of the five-yearly agency capability reports, though 
they will not necessarily be consulted in the preparation of such reports.   But beyond 
that, ministers are absent from discussion. 
On first sight, the relative absence of ministers may not be surprising, given that 
the report concentrates on internal matters that are largely in the direct control of 
secretaries.  In fact, however, the report is keenly interested in some aspects of the 
relationship with ministers but chooses not to make this interest explicit.  In 
particular, the report gives tacit support to the ‘politicisation’ critique of the Howard 
years, that secretaries and senior public servants had become too close to the political 
concerns of their political masters. It records (22, 46), and by implication endorses, 
feedback from public servants complaining that they are encouraged to give advice 
that ministers want to hear at the expense of being frank and fearless.  A contrast is 
drawn between being merely ‘reactive’ rather than ‘strategic’ in developing policy 
advice (21) which is presumably code for meeting the short-term demands of 
ministers rather than concentrating on long-term priorities of the department.   
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More important, changes to secretaries’ conditions of appointment (48) 
implicitly accept the criticism of Podger (Podger 2007a; 2007b) and others that 
secretaries have become over-politicised because of the insecurity of their tenure.  
The Australian Public Service Commissioner is to be given a stronger role in 
secretary appointments, alongside the Secretary of Prime Minister and Cabinet.  The 
length of appointment for secretaries is to be fixed at five years for all secretaries 
rather than, as at present, being allowed to vary up to five years.  Equivalent 
employment or fair compensation is guaranteed for those whose tenure is terminated 
early.  If  these recommended changes to tenure are implemented and sustained, the 
Moran report will be seen to be an important turning point in the history of public 
service relations with ministers, marking a re-assertion of a more independent public 
service.   
No specific rationale is given for these changes. They are simply included in a 
range of measures aimed at improving leadership, supporting secretaries in their role 
and discouraging too much risk aversion (45).  Moran and his colleagues in the 
Advisory Group imply that secretaries’ tenure has become too weak for them to do 
their jobs properly. Greater security of tenure will presumably give secretaries more 
confidence to plan for the longer term and to assert their own judgment in preference 
to following the short-term demands from ministers and their advisers.  In this case,  
the Advisory Group appear to have agreed that the balance between responsiveness 
and independence ought to be shifted back somewhat towards greater independence 
for secretaries, though they chose not to make this argument directly.   
In effect, the Moran report is advocating a significant change in direction, away 
from the Keating/Shergold insistence on upwards political responsiveness to 
ministerial direction, and more towards the older, Coombs/Wilenski view of a policy-
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driving, outward-looking public service.   Perhaps the Advisory Group did not want to 
buy openly into debates about public service independence and about whether the 
current arrangements for appointing secretaries had led to undue politicisation. To 
locate their recommendations within these debates might have led the Group into 
unwanted public controversy.  It would have underlined the fact that the Group was 
siding with Podger’s recent criticisms of excessive responsiveness against Shergold’s 
rebuttal of such criticisms. The Group may not have wished to draw public attention 
to the fact that it was repudiating Moran’s immediate predecessor while siding with 
the most authoritative critic of the Howard government’s treatment of the public 
service. Instead, it recommended the changes to tenure without any immediate context 
or argument.   
A reluctance to provoke controversy may be understandable in view of the 
Advisory Group’s closeness to government and its members’ ingrained habits of 
public discretion.  But the omission is none the less disappointing from the 
perspective of serious analysis of the APS.  The relationship between ministers and 
senior public servants is an important and perennially contested topic which benefits 
from regular, authoritative re-examination, from insiders as well as from outside 
observers.  Recent debate on this issue has centred on the question of secretaries’ 
tenure.  By making important recommendations on tenure without explicitly 
confronting the question of responsiveness versus independence and the charges of 
undue politicisation, the Advisory Group has passed up the opportunity to contribute 
to the stock of  substantial analysis on the topic. 
The Group’s unwillingness to locate the changes in historical context or within a 
more clearly articulated vision of the relationship between ministers and public 
servants is a matter not just for academic regret.  It can also be seen as a missed 
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chance to exercise leadership within the broader public service.  No doubt, the history 
and values of the public service are so well known to the current leaders of the APS 
that they do not need spelling out.  But the next generation of leaders needs its own 
sense of where the APS has come from and where it may be heading. It might expect 
a report such as this to offer a broader narrative of the APS’s role, including a history 
of its relationship with ministers.  
Managing without ministers 
In other respects, too, the report is silent about how ministers act in partnership 
with public servants in the task of government.   For instance, the discussion of 
leadership and strategic advice casts public servants as the key drivers of policy 
development, taking initiatives and choosing priorities for study.  Public servants are 
encouraged to consult widely with stakeholders in business, academia and the broader 
community to develop new policy initiatives (20, 43) but ministers and their offices 
are not explicitly involved in these processes.  Ministers are left in the more passive 
role of recipients of completed advice and legitimators of final decisions.   
There is no emphasis on the right of ministers to drive the processes of policy-
making and policy-implementation. No mention is made of the obligation to be 
responsive to the priorities of ministers as democratically elected leaders. No formal 
consideration is given to meeting the accountability requirements of ministers who 
must answer for all the activities of the department.   
At the same time, the newly emphasised ‘stewardship’ role for secretaries (5, 22, 
47), linked with their function as ‘the custodians of the public sector’ (21), appears to 
give them sole responsibility for the general capacity of the public service, beyond 
serving the interests of the government of the day (5).  Such language could be read as 
significant departure from Australian constitutional norms in which departments are 
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administered by ministers (Constitution of Australia s 64) and in which the formal 
role of secretaries is to assist ministers in all aspects of such administration. No legal 
or ethical barrier prevents ministers from taking an interest in their departments’ long-
term capacity and, indeed, some ministers have done so.  In practice, certainly, 
ministers are more likely to be focusing on more immediate issues and will be content 
to rely on their secretaries to further the stewardship function.  But, formally 
speaking, this will be a role in which secretaries assist their ministers rather than one 
where they exercise sole responsibility.  The Advisory Group, presumably, did not 
intend not wish to deny the constitutional right of ministers to oversee their 
departments.  But its language of stewardship and custodianship comes close to 
implying such as an assertion..   
Another area where ministers are overlooked is in the general thrust to make the 
public service better meet the needs of citizens through greater engagement with 
citizens as well as with local interests and communities.  The present system of 
service delivery to citizens is said to be overly uniform and at the same time 
excessively fragmented between different agencies and levels of government.  Service 
delivery needs to be re-engineered to allow for policy ‘co-production’ between 
government and citizens, as well as greater local integration and better feedback from 
citizens at the coalface (17-19). 
Through adopting the language of citizen engagement, the report hints at the 
familiar critique of top-down government that its ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach fails to 
meet the diverse needs of citizens.  Central control therefore needs to replaced, or, at 
the very least, significantly supplemented, by direct, bottom-up responsiveness to the 
grass roots. Public management reformers, drawing on private-sector attention to the 
demands of consumers in a market, have talked of improving the client or customer 
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focus of public service delivery (eg OECD 1987; Lodge 2001; Pollitt 2003, 98-102).  
In its political science versions, the bottom-up critique has questioned the democratic 
credentials of representative democracy, which relies on elected politicians as the 
main conduit for relaying the citizens’ demands from their government (Dryzek 
2000).   Elected leaders are seen as distant and elitist, far removed from the concerns 
of ordinary citizens (Mansbridge 1999).  Democracy and the wishes of the people will 
be better served by allowing the citizens more direct control over government at the 
local level.    
By emphasising citizen engagement, while being almost silent on service to 
elected ministers, the Moran report implicitly endorses a preference for grass-roots 
responsiveness over popular responsiveness via elected ministers.  Indeed, the key 
terms ‘responsive’ and ‘responsiveness’, while banished from the lexicon of 
ministerial-departmental relations, are used freely (18, 32, 33, 49) to refer to the need 
for public servants to listen to local communities (another echo of Coombs).  The 
report also embraces the language of ‘whole-of-government’ which stresses 
coordination within a single level (horizontal coordination).  
 In practice, it should be noted, the proposed extent of engagement with local 
communities and citizens is modest.  Most emphasis is placed on improved co-
ordination with other levels of government, which are presumably more closer attuned 
to local needs, and on a larger and more flexible role for community sector 
organisations that can engage directly with local communities   Expanded use of 
information technology will lead to better and faster communication and 
collaboration. On-line surveys of opinion will provide better information for head-
office policy-makers who need to have a better understanding of implementation 
issues.   
 12
While some potentially useful initiatives are suggested in the direction of greater 
community involvement, there is little hint of the more radical devolution of decision-
making envisaged by most champions of citizen-centred government and grass-roots 
participation.  Even on the vexed issue of Commonwealth-State cooperation, the 
report appears to leave most initiative with the Commonwealth through the use of 
Commonwealth funding agreements (36).  Much of the new coordination will happen 
at the centre, with whole-of-government initiatives centred on the new Secretaries 
Board convened by the Secretary of PM& C (but with no explicit role for the Prime 
Minister). The central government remains firmly in control of both policy and 
implementation.  
A major, unspoken, reason for this centralising tendency lies in the political 
environment in which the APS operates.  The conventions of ministerial responsibility 
require ministers to answer for their departments and to take charge in response to 
public concerns.  The federal opposition’s obsession with claiming ministerial scalps, 
eagerly reported by the national media as part of the continuous election campaign, 
means that ministers are always in the frontline of government accountability, 
particularly when issues become controversial.  In Australia’s top-down political 
culture, ministers cannot readily pass the buck down the line to junior officials, 
subordinate levels of government or local communities.    
As a result, the practicable extent of genuine devolution away from central 
government is severely circumscribed.  Secretaries are under pressure to see that 
policies and programs are administered in ways that ministers will be able to defend 
publicly.   They cannot afford to relinquish much control, even if they genuinely 
wished to.  The Moran report, however, by omitting direct reference to the pervasive 
influence of ministers, glosses over this political context and over the unresolved 
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tensions between top-down and bottom-up responsiveness.  In doing so, it gives the 
impression that secretaries remain in sole charge at the centre, occasionally 
accountable to the public through grass-roots responsiveness to citizens and 
communities but otherwise  answerable only to themselves, the stewards of their own 
fiefdoms.  
Again, presumably, the Advisory Group would not endorse such a partial view 
of the role of secretaries.  As the report’s introductory preamble makes clear, senior 
public servants will still operate within Westminster principles of public 
administration.  In that case, secretaries and their colleagues will still be under more 
or less continuous direction from the minister and the minister’s office on many 
matters, both large and small (Rhodes and Wanna 2009, 170).  Ministers will still 
exercise their right to direct strategic priorities and to intervene in details of policy 
implementation.  Public expectations of ministerial responsibility, driven by 
opposition politicians and the media, will still force ministers to be accountable for 
actions of their departments, thus helping to cement the loyalty of officials to their 
ministers (as well as frustrating any sustained attempt to devolve power from the 
centre to the grass-roots).   
The Advisory Group, no doubt, takes the practical  reality of continuous 
ministerial direction for granted. In their report, however, they have chosen not to 
openly acknowledge this political reality or to spell out their own view of how 
ministers, and the political dimension generally, should fit into the role of secretaries 
and the public service.  Again, their reticence is politically understandable and, 
paradoxically, may be read as a testament to their deeply imbued habits of public 
deference to ministers.   None the less, by giving an incomplete picture of their 
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environment, they have missed an opportunity to educate others in the public service 
and beyond who lack their institutional memory and depth of understanding. 
A misleading model of management   
Another, broader reason for questioning an account of the public service that 
marginalises the impact of ministers is that such an approach tends to reinforce a 
dominant and misleading model of public management.  In current management 
discourse, the manager is seen as a relatively autonomous leader exercising a 
considerable degree of discretion.   How far such a view is applicable to the average 
department head in a Westminster jurisdiction is open to serious doubt. 
   Management theory originates in business schools and focuses on the 
paradigmatic role of the company CEO and senior managers who are in day-to-day 
control of large organisations.  Company managers are responsible for shaping their 
organisation’s strategic direction and for overseeing the implementation of its chosen 
projects and programs.  They may be subject to the ultimate authority of owners and 
shareholders but such oversight is relatively distant. It is typically exercised through a 
board of part-time directors who do not intervene in management decisions and leave 
the managers free to exercise decisive, strategic leadership within their organisations.   
Working from within a business context, management theory offers generalised 
models of how managers should perform the various functions of organisational 
leadership, such as strategic planning, project management, and human resource 
management and so on, and how they should engage proactively with their various 
stakeholders.  These management models have been applied  to public sector 
organisations, firstly in the United States, where business enjoys particular prestige as 
a benchmark for government  performance (Downs and Larkey 1986), and then 
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internationally where they have become part of the staple toolkit of public 
management consultants.   
Whether private sector models of management can be successfully transferred to 
public organisations has been a matter of controversy (Allison 1983: Rainey and Chun 
2005, 92-5).  The public sector has certain unique features that affect the conduct of 
management, for instance the lack of economic objectives and price signals, greater 
scrutiny and accountability because of government’s coercive powers, and  greater 
goal ambiguity.  None the less, making allowance for differences in context, many 
generic management skills and techniques are applicable to both public and private 
organisations (Hughes 2003, 6; Hood 2005, 8).   
More important than a general contrast between the two sectors are differences 
between types of organisation within each sector which significantly affect their style 
of management and the relevance of management models developed for large 
commercial companies.  In particular, public agencies differ markedly in the degree of 
discretionary freedom enjoyed by chief executives and other senior managers.   
In the United States, for instance, heads of government departments exercise a 
comparatively wide discretion not unlike that of corporate CEOs. The separation of 
powers between the legislature and the executive means that department heads, 
though technically part of the executive and under the direction of the president or 
governor, are in practice also directly accountable to the legislature.  The legislature 
controls their budget and its committees exercise direct control over their activities.  
Department heads deal directly with both the White House and Congress and must try 
to maintain  the confidence of both. In the words of a respected United States scholar, 
the leader of a federal department acts as an ‘accountable juggler’ because of the need 
to juggle conflicting  responsibilities to the President and to Congress (Radin 2002).  
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Moreover, once a department head is seen as relatively independent of both 
President and Congress, he or she also has more freedom to relate directly to other 
organisations whose interests overlap, for instance, lobby groups and representatives 
of state and local governments.  In such a heavily pluralised system, the agency is 
located at the centre of a constellation of competing organisations, private as well as 
public.  The agency head is not directly responsible or accountable to a single 
authority but instead charts his or her own separate course, taking care to manage all 
the key relationships accordingly.   
In such a context, it makes good sense to apply a private sector-management 
model of executive discretion and entrepreneurial initiative.  The political and legal 
context may be different from that faced by a company CEO.  But the essential 
feature of operating in an environment of conflicting pressures with a relatively high 
degree of leadership autonomy is common to both. For this reason, the United States 
version of the New Public Management movement in the 1990s stressed the 
entrepreneurial autonomy of agency heads rather than any need to bring them under 
political control (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Moore 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004).  It is this US-friendly approach to public management and leadership that is 
now dominant among international consultants and is being applied to the Australian 
public sector, for example in the Moran report .   
By contrast, the head of a government department in a Westminster-style 
parliamentary system is unequivocally under the minister’s direct control and answers 
directly to the minister.  The relationship with the minister dominates all other 
relationships and cannot be placed on an equal footing with them.  Concepts such as 
‘negotiation’ or ‘managing’ are misleading terms to describe dealings with a minister 
who has the right to demand compliance.  Department heads, while exercising a 
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degree of professional independence, act as their ministers’ loyal assistants (a 
relationship well captured in the Canadians’ use of the term ‘deputy minister’ for their 
equivalent of Australia’s secretaries).   
Significantly, the version of the New Public Management applied to 
Westminster regimes such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, was 
partly designed to curb the independence of  professional bureaucrats (Halligan 1997).  
Managers were to be given more autonomy by being held accountable in terms of 
results rather than inputs and processes. But the desired results were to be decided by 
democratically elected politicians, not captured by public servants (Keating 1990).   
In Westminster systems, upwards accountability to the minister, through 
conventions of ministerial responsibility, remains the dominant mechanism of 
accountability and control.  Accountability to ministers may be supplemented by other 
accountability avenues, such as parliamentary committees and audit, but always in 
ways that do not threaten the status of departmental officials as the servants of 
ministers (Mulgan 2003, ch 2).  The United States, on the other hand,  lacks any direct 
equivalent of ministerial responsibility.  Upward chains of accountability certainly 
apply within agencies up to the agency head  but agency heads themselves operate in 
a less monolithic, and more pluralist, political environment.  For this reason, analyses 
of public service accountability developed in the United States remain fundamentally 
distinct from those applicable to Westminster-style regimes (and other closely similar 
European systems such as the Netherlands) (Bovens 2007).  
Thus, international management theory and its models of strategic leadership, 
though well suited to the United States, where they were first developed, can be 
potentially misleading when applied to Westminster government departments.  By 
placing the minister on the margins they give a distorted  picture of how department 
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heads actually operate.  Indeed, within Westminster systems such as Australia’s, the 
models are much more applicable to non-departmental public agencies, such as 
statutory authorities (not the main focus of the Moran report) than to government 
departments. Chief executives of arms-length statutory authorities, such as the 
Reserve Bank or the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, are responsible to boards 
of part-time directors in much the same way as company chief executives are 
responsible to their boards of directors (indeed, the institutional structure of statutory 
authorities is closely modelled on that of publicly listed companies (Uhrig 2003)).  
While the managers of statutory authorities often operate in a highly political 
environment, the extent of their formal discretion as managers is still essentially 
similar to that enjoyed by the CEOs of large companies. It therefore makes sense for 
them to adopt international management theories of strategic leadership.  Such 
theories, on the other hand, as the Moran report illustrates, are seriously deficient 
when applied to the heads of core public service departments within a Westminster-
style system.  
  The public value debate 
Many of these issues have been recently canvassed by Rod Rhodes and John 
Wanna in articles attacking the concept of ‘public value’, as developed by the US 
public management academic Michael Moore (Moore 1995; Rhodes and Wanna, 
2007; 2009).  Moore’s theory seeks to empower public servants by encouraging them 
to see themselves as creating public value rather than simply following instructions or 
pursuing  their own institutional self-interest.  ‘Public value’ is deliberately vague in 
content, not unlike the longstanding notion of the public interest.  Its main purpose is 
to indicate a concern for the good of the community, however defined, as the 
dominant motivation of public servants, particularly public managers.  Rhodes and 
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Wanna argue that Moore casts public servants in the role of Platonic guardians whose 
monopoly of wisdom gives them the right to determine the direction the state.  Such 
empowerment, they argue, usurps the democratic influence of party politics and 
ministers,  particularly in Westminster systems.   
Rhodes and Wanna may be guilty of  some rhetorical overstatement, particularly 
in their first article (Rhodes and Wanna 2007) where they certainly downplay the 
extent to which Moore’s  public managers are sensitive to their political environment 
and obliged to negotiate with politicians as well as other stakeholders (Alford and 
O’Flynn 2009, 176-8).  Moore envisages public managers working in a ‘strategic 
triangle’, one element of which is the authorising environment which provides 
legitimacy and support and in which elected political leaders play a key role. Indeed, 
his analysis of public leadership fits well with Radin’s notion of the ‘accountable 
juggler’ in which agency heads negotiate their way through a minefield of conflicting 
pressures.  Such a model is significantly different from Plato’s theory of all-powerful, 
unaccountable guardians.  
However, Rhodes and Wanna are on much surer ground when they later confine 
their criticism of Moore to the context of Westminster-based government systems 
(Rhodes and Wanna 2009).  Moore’s theory of public value, they concede, may be 
applicable in a United States political context but it is not appropriate, either 
empirically or normatively, in a Westminster setting.  To place Westminster ministers 
in the same category as other stakeholders with whom departmental heads must deal 
or to describe Westminster departmental heads as ‘negotiating’ with their ministers is 
to seriously misdescribe and distort the relationship between ministers and their senior 
public servants.  
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The Moran report, perhaps wary of unnecessarily fanning the flames of 
academic controversy, does not openly espouse the concept of public value and, 
indeed, wholly avoids the term.  But its emphasis on concepts of leadership and 
strategic planning appears to share Moore’s willingness to place senior public 
servants in the role of  key architects of government policy as well as key controllers 
of public service delivery.  For that reason, the report lays itself open to some of the 
same charges of distorting the role of public servants in Westminster systems that  
Rhodes and Wanna make against the use of public value, and the for the same reason 
– the uncritical adoption of a US-based model of public management. 
The need for new model 
Westminster systems require their own model of public service management.  
The generic concept of management itself, with its emphasis on goal-oriented 
leadership and decision-making, is not the problem.  Departmental heads clearly focus 
much of their effort on clarifying priorities and driving change, the classic functions 
of management.  The notion of a public service ‘manager’, as distinct from a 
departmental ‘officer’, has proved its value in focusing senior public servants on the 
important goals of greater efficiency and effectiveness.  Indeed, notions of the public 
interest and public value can also have their proper place in the public servant’s 
lexicon, provided they allow for the central role of ministers and the conventions of 
ministerial responsibility.  The difficulties arise not from a managerial approach per 
se but from misapplying particular management models to inappropriate 
constitutional settings. 
Arguably, the use of a misleading model may not do much harm if it is not taken 
literally.  As already noted, most successful senior public servants are fully aware of 
the political straitjacket that constrains most of their activities.  They would not last 
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long in their positions if they actually exercised the degree of managerial autonomy 
implied by the management models espoused on their behalf.  Long years of 
experience in ascending the ladder of bureaucratic hierarchy have taught them how to 
anticipate and internalise the demands of successive ministers.  They learn to talk the 
rhetoric of autonomous management while carefully taking on board the minister’s 
(and the prime minister’s) directions. 
On the other hand, to expect an important constitutional value, such as 
democratic responsiveness to ministerial direction, to persist without explicit 
reaffirmation may be over-optimistic.  It may reinforce the view, already common in 
parts of the public service (Mulgan 2008, 347), that acceding to the political demands 
of ministers is selling out to disreputable politics at the expense of good policy and 
the public interest.  Public servants need constant reminders that politicians are 
legitimate partners in policy-making and service delivery.  At a time when the 
relations between public servants and ministerial offices are becoming increasingly 
fraught (Tiernan 2007), both sides require guidance in how to navigate their mutual 
dealings 
Australia has a long tradition, both academic and professional, of debating the 
relationship between elected politicians and permanent public servants. The 
relationship is complex and subtle and requires situational judgments about striking a 
balance between conflicting principles, such as deference to democratically elected 
politicians, respect for political neutrality, defence of constitutional priority and so on.  
The Moran report has implicitly contributed to these debates, particularly by its 
recommendations on secretaries’ tenure and a strengthened role for the APSC.  That it 
did so within the framework of an incomplete and inappropriate model  of public 
management will inevitably limit its wider impact.   
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